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We consider the ideal-gas models of trading markets, where each agent is identified with a gas
molecule and each trading as an elastic or money-conserving (two-body) collision. Unlike in the
ideal gas, we introduce saving propensity λ of agents, such that each agent saves a fraction λ of its
money and trades with the rest. We show the steady-state money or wealth distribution in a market
is Gibbs-like for λ = 0, has got a non-vanishing most-probable value for λ 6= 0 and Pareto-like when
λ is widely distributed among the agents. We compare these results with observations on wealth
distributions of various countries.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge;89.90.+n;02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier conference in Kolkata in 1994, many lead-
ing Indian economists from the Indian Statistical Insti-
tute and physicists met and discussed about the possible
formulations of some economic problems and their solu-
tions using tricks from physics [1]. In one of these papers
[2], possibly the first published joint paper with both
physicist and economist Indian coauthors, the possibility
of a kinetic theory of (ideal) gas-like model of trading in
the market was discussed. Among other things, it tried to
identify, from the known effects of various fiscal policies,
equivalence of the (kinetic) energy of the gas molecules
(money) and the temperature (averagemoney in the mar-
ket). Such a “finite temperature” market model and
the corresponding distributions were also noted by oth-
ers [3, 4]. With the possibility of putting more than one
agent in the same (micro) state, identified by the price or
money income of the agent in the market, the likely dis-
tribution was concluded there to be Bose-Einstein like,
rather than Gibbs like [2]. These studies of course had the
limitation of absence of any comparison with real income
distributions (in any market or country). In a recent pa-
per by Dragulescu and Yakovenko [4] a simple (trading)
market model was developed with fixed (total) money
and number of agents in the market. Random two-agent
exchanges (with local money conservation) lead to Gibbs-
like steady income distribution. This was also confirmed
by simple numerical simulations. Modifications due to
savings was studied simultaneously [5]. In a very recent
review [6], a popular introduction to these developments
is given.
Saving propensity among the agents, a very selfish and
local feature of the tradings, introduce in effect some
global co-operative feature (cf. [5]). We show that a
fixed and uniform saving propensity of all the agents in
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the market shifts the most-probable money of the distri-
bution away from zero (as given by Gibbs for zero sav-
ings), while a random distribution of saving propensity
among the population can give the Pareto (power) law
[7]
P (m) ∼ m−(1+ν) (1)
for the wealth or money (m) distribution. We intend to
discuss here in brief the effects of various kinds of savings
on the ideal gas-like money distributions in the above-
mentioned market models, and compare our observations
with those from real markets.
II. AN IDEAL GAS-LIKE MARKET MODEL
Let us consider a simple model of a closed economic
system where the total amount of money M and the to-
tal number N of agents are fixed. No development (pro-
duction) or migration (death/birth of agents) occurs and
the only economic activity is confined to trading. Each
agent i, individual or a corporate, possess a money mi(t)
at (discretised) time t. Time changes after each trad-
ing. In any trading, two randomly chosen agents i and j
exchange their money such that their total money is (lo-
cally) conserved and none ends up with negative money
(debt not allowed):
mi(t) +mj(t) = mi(t+ 1) +mj(t+ 1) (2)
where mi(t) ≥ 0 for all i and t;
∑N
i=1mi = M . Since
money is conserved, in the steady state (t → ∞), the
probability P (m) of the density of people with money m
will satisfy
P (m1)P (m2) = P (m1 +m2) (3)
2which corresponds to the Gibbs distribution [4, 5]
P (m) = (1/T ) exp (−m/T ) ; T = M/N. (4)
Numerical simulations in the model also confirmed the
steady state distribution of money, no matter what initial
distribution of money the agents had, to be Gibbs’ one:
after sufficient number of tradings, most of the agents
end up with very little money! This result is quite ro-
bust (and realistic too!). In fact, several variations of
the trading, and of the ‘lattice’ (on which the agents can
be put and each agent trade with its ‘lattice neighbours’
only), whether compact, fractal or small-world [3], leaves
the distribution unchanged. Some other variations like
random sharing of an amount 2m2 only (not of m1+m2)
when m1 > m2 (trading at the level of lower economic
class), lead to even drastic situation: all the money in
the market drifts to one agent and the rest of the agents
all become truely pauper [6, 8]! Attempts have also been
made [9] to get Pareto-like power-law distribution here
with changed definition of entropy or the conservation
law (cf. eqn. (3)).
Chakrabarti and Marjit [2] argued for the Bose-
Einstein like distribution (rather than Gibbs) in such
a market (with the temperature T similarly identified
with the average moneyM/N per agent), as one can put
more than one agent in the same economic state (spec-
ified by the income) and the maximisation of the con-
sequent entropy. For the possibility of adding and sub-
tracting agents into/from the market, one similarly needs
(negative) “chemical potential” which becomes zero at a
finite temperature or money level in the market, when
the “Bose condensed” fraction of the agents will fall out
of the market distribution and might be identified as un-
employed.
The real income distributions did not indicate so far
anything like the Bose distribution; rather considerable
evidences support the possibility of Gibbs like distribu-
tion (4) in the income (almost for 90% of the low-income
range) of various countries (see e.g., [10], see also data in
[11]; Fig. 2).
III. MODEL WITH FIXED SAVING
PROPENSITY OF THE AGENTS
Here we assume [5] that each economic agent i saves
a fraction λ of its money mi(t) before the trading at
time t. We again assume that an agent’s money is non-
negative and no debt is permitted. Let us now consider
an arbitrary pair of agents i and j, who get engaged in a
trade, and their money mi(t) and mj(t) before the trade
change respectively to
mi(t+1) = mi(t)+∆m; mj(t+1) = mj(t)−∆m (5)
where ∆m = (1− λ)[ǫ{mi(t) +mj(t)} −mi(t)]; (6)
with ǫ as any random fraction. As may be checked by
straight-forward substitution, this kind of trading again
satisfies eqn. (2), while each agent saves a fixed fraction
λ of its money before the trade and exchanges randomly
(with fraction ǫ) the rest of the money.
One finds here that at λ = 0 the market becomes non-
interacting and the steady state money distribution be-
comes the Gibbs’ one. For any nonvanishing λ, the equi-
librium distribution becomes asymmetric Gibbs-like (see
inset of Fig. 1) with the most-probable money mp per
agent (corresponding to the peak in P (m)) shifting away
from m = 0 (for λ = 0) to M/N as λ → 1 [5]. This
self-organising feature of the market, induced by sheer
self-interest of saving by each agent without any global
perspective, is very significant as the fraction of paupers
decreases with saving fraction λ and most people end up
with the average money in the market (socialists’ dream
achieved with just people’s self-interest of saving)! In-
terestingly, self-organisation also occur in such market
models when there is restriction in the commodity market
[12]. Although this fixed saving propensity does not give
yet the Pareto-like power-law distribution, the Marko-
vian nature of the scattering or trading processes (eqn.
(3)) is lost and the system becomes co-operative. Indi-
rectly through λ, the agents get to know (start interact-
ing with) each other and the system co-operatively self-
organise towards a most probable distribution (mp 6= 0).
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FIG.1: Money distribution P (m) in the model for distributed λ
(0 ≤ λ < 1). Inset shows P (m) for three typical values in the fixed
λ case (including λ = 0; Gibbs). For both cases, N = 100 play
with average money per agent M/N = 1.
IV. MODEL WITH RANDOM SAVING
PROPENSITY OF THE AGENTS
We now consider a market again with fixed N and
M but with random saving propensity λi (0 ≤ λi < 1)
fixed or “quenched” for each agent (λi are independent of
3trading or t, but vary randomly from agent to agent) [13].
One again follows the same trading rules as mentioned
in the previous section (eqn. (5)), except that
∆m = ǫ(1− λj)mj(t)− (1− λi)(1 − ǫ)mi(t) (7)
here; λi and λj are the saving propensities of agents i and
j. We first take a market with N agents, each having a
fixed saving propensity λ distributed independently, ran-
domly and uniformly (white) within an interval 0 to 1.
Having assigned each agent i the saving propensities λi,
and starting with an arbitrary initial (uniform or ran-
dom) distribution of money among the agents, we start
the tradings. At each time, two agents are randomly
selected and the money exchange among them occurs,
following the above mentioned scheme. We check for the
steady state, by looking at the stability of the money
distribution P (m) in successive Monte Carlo steps t.
In Fig. 1, we show the money distribution P (m) vs.
m (in units of M/N) for N = 100, M/N = 1, after
averaging over 106 initial configurations (λi distribution
among the agents) at t/N =10,000. There is an initial
growth of P (m) from m = 0, which quickly saturates
and then a long range of power-law decay in P (m) for
large m values (for less than 10% of the population N
in the market) is observed (for more than two decades
in m). This decay, when fitted to Pareto law (1), gives
ν = 1.03± 0.03.
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FIG.2: Cumulative distribution Q(m) =
∫
∞
m
P (m)dm of wealth m
in USA [10] in 1997 and Japan [11] in 2000. Low-income group
follow Gibbs law (shaded region) and the rest (about 5%) of the
rich population follow Pareto law. The inset shows the cumulative
distribution for a model market where p = 0.9 fraction of the agents
trade randomly without any saving and the rest 1−p fraction trades
with their saving propensities distributed uniformly between 0 and
1. The dotted line (for large m values) corresponds to ν = 1.0.
We now investigate on the range of distribution of the
saving propensities within the population. If a certain
fraction p of the population trades in the market ran-
domly without any saving while the rest (1− p) fraction
have a quenched distribution of their saving propensi-
ties (0 ≤ λi < 1), we observe that for larger values of p
(p > 0.8), the distribution is Gibbs-like for low-income
group and has a power law tail for the high-income group.
The range of validity of Gibbs law increases with increas-
ing p. However, the exponent ν does not change with
p. These model wealth distributions P (m) compare very
well with the wealth distributions of various countries:
Data suggests Gibbs like distribution in the low-income
range [10] (more than 90% of the population) and Pareto-
like in the high-income range [11] (less than 10% of the
population) of various countries (Fig. 2).
We also considered annealed randomness an the saving
propensity λ: here λi for any agent i changes from one
value to another within the range 0 ≤ λi < 1, after each
trading. Numerical studies for this annealed model did
not show any power law behavior for P (m); rather it
again becomes exponentially decaying on both sides of a
most-probable value mp(λ), similar to fixed λ case.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have considered ideal-gas models of trading mar-
kets. In these models, we introduce saving propensity λ
of agents, such that each agent saves a fraction λ of its
money and trades with the rest. We show the steady-
state money or wealth distribution P (m) in the market
is that of Gibbs (4) for λ = 0, has got a non-vanishing
most-probable value for λ > 0 (but fixed for all agents),
and one gets Pareto distribution (1) with ν ≃ 1.0 when
λ is widely distributed among the agents. These results
in simple ideal-gas like market models also compare well
with real market observations.
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